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NOTES AND COMMENTS

language that leads three Courts of Appeals to decide that it has not
said so and three that it has." Another point raised by the dissent is
that Congress has included the additional crimes in question here in other
statutes. Section 2314 of Title 18, U. S. C., 31 which deals with the
transportation of stolen goods, securities, monies, or articles used in
counterfeiting, expressly provides for false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.
In view of the authorities which apparently can be relied upon for
support of either of the divergent views, possible arguments in favor
of one view or the other must ultimately resolve themselves into differences of opinion on the concept of the judicial function of which the
Supreme Court is final arbiter. Clearly, the decision has resolved the
conflict and possibly the decision will effect the result which the Congress
would have chosen had it finally passed on this issue. The Supreme
Court, however, may have overlooked the language of Mr. Justice
Holmes in McBoyle v. United States,3 2 which involved an interpretation
of the same statute:
"Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider
the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do
if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as
possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid
down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of
vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to
aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy
applies or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought
of it, very likely, broader words would have been used."
HENRY H.

IS4ACSON.

Criminal Law-Federal Courts-Appealability of Order Suppressing
and Returning Evidence
In United States v. Ponder,' election officials were indicted for
election fraud. Fourteen months earlier the District Court had ordered
certain election ballots, books, and returns impounded on application of
the U. S. District Attorney. After the indictment, and before trial, the
defendants moved for the return and suppression of evidence of the im" 48 STAT. 794 (1934), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2314 (1952), as amended,
18 U. S. C. A. § 2314 (Supp. 1956) ; See also 37 Stat. 670, as amended, 18 U. S. C.
§ 659 (1952) (stealing and embezzlement).
2283 U. S.25 (1931).
'238 F. 2d 825 (4th Cir. 1956).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

pounded materials. The motion was granted and the government appealed. On appeal, the defendants interposed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the order of suppression was merely a mesne order in
the criminal action, without appealable finality. The Court of Appeals
held that the order was a final decision and reviewable by virtue of section 1291, title 28, United States Code. The Court stated that the test of
whether an application for apeal is interlocutory or final, in cases where
the application is filed in the form of a motion in the cause, is its essential
character and the circumstances under which it is made. The Court
held the order to be independent and appealable because the title and
terms of the impounding order and the public character of the materials
in question indicated its individuality. Further, the order dissolved the
pound and had the effect of dismissing the indictment, other factors relevant to appealability. 2
A final order may be reviewed by way of immediate appeal or writ
of error, but in the absence of statute, an interlocutory order may not be
so reviewed. 3 The purpose underlying the requirement of finality is to4
avoid piecemeal litigation and the delays caused by interlocutory appeals.
For the purpose of determining whether an order is final or interlocutory,
a distinction is made between proceedings incidental or ancillary to a
criminal action, in which case it is considered interlocutory and nonappealable, and independent proceedngs, in which case it is deemed final
and appealable. 5
Where application for the suppression or return of evidence wrongfully seized is made in a plenary proceeding, i.e., a proceeding neither
ancillary to nor directly affecting the pending prosecution, its independent character has been said to be obvious, the appealability of a decree
rendered therein being unaffected by the fact that the purpose of the
suit is solely to influence or control the trial of a pending criminal prosecution.0 Where an application for return of papers or other property is
made by motion or other summary proceeding, for instance, because the
person in possession is an officer of the court, its essential character and
the circumstances under which it is made will determine whether it is
2 Section 3731, title 28, United States Code Annotated provides that an order
dismissing an indictment is appealable. In the principal case, the Courf equated the
suppression of the evidence essential to the prosecution with dismissal of the indictment.

' See 2 Am. JuR., Appeal and Error,§ 21; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 332

(U. S. 1938).
' See Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945) ; Lewis v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 183 F. 2d 29 (5th Cir. 1950); State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162,
281 S. W. 936 (1926).

United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U. S. 793 (1949); Cogen v.
States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929).
United
C Cogen v. United States supra note 5.
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an independent proceeding or merely a step in the trial of a criminal
case.7
One of the most important factors in determining the appealability
of an order denying or granting a motion for the suppression or return
of evidence is the pendency of a criminal action in which such evidence
is to be used. Where the application for the suppression or return of
evidence is made before an information or indictment against the applicant, the proceeding has been held to be independent and the resulting
order final and appealable.8 On the other hand, it is generally held not
appealable where, at the time the application was filed, a criminal action
against the applicant was undisposed of and pending in the same court. 9
The time at which the application is filed, rather than the time at which
it is passed upon by the court, has been held to be controlling in determining the character of the proceeding. 10 Where the motion for suppression and return is made before indictment and ruled on after indictment, the court in United States v. Poller," reasoned that, conceivably,
it might be held that the proceeding became merged in the indictment,
but the result would be to make the appealability of the order depend
upon the diligence of the prosecution of the proceeding, or of the judge
in deciding it, either of which is an unsatisfactory test. The court concluded that it seems more reasonable to use the time of its first initiation
12
as the test.
7
Ibid.

' Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931), (reversing
United States v. Gowen, 40 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1930); Cogen v. United States,
278 U. S. 221 (1929); Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918); Weldon v.
United States, 196 F. 2d 874 (9th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Rosenwasser, 145
F. 2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Davis v. United States, 138 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U. S. 775 (1944); Cheng Wai v. United States; 125 F. 2d 915
(2d Cir. 1942) ; Turner v. Camp, 123 F. 2d 840 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Re Sana Labora-

tories, Inc., 115 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub nom. Sana Laboratories,
Inc. v. United States, 312 U. S. 688 (1941) ; Re Cudahy Packing Co., 104 F. 2d 658
(2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Edelson, 83 F. 2d 404 (2d Cir. 1936); Re Mil-

burne, 77 F. 2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935) ; United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (2d Cir.
1930).
' Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929) ; United States v. Rosenwasser,
145 F. 2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Kelley, 105 F. 2d 912 (2d Cir.
1939) ; United States v. Sheehan, 57 F. 2d 759 (D. C. Cir. 1932) ; United States v.
Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Jacobs v. United States, 8 F. 2d 981 (9th Cir.
1925); United States v. Bronde, 299 Fed. 332 (D. C. Cir. 1924); United States

v. Mattingly, 285 Fed. 922 (D. C. Cir. 1922); United States v. Marquette, 270
Fed. 214 (9th Cir. 1921); United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (D. C. Cir.
1920) ; Coastline Lumber and Supply Co. v. United States, 259 Fed. 847 (2d Cir.
1919).
" Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929) ; Re Sana Laboratories, Inc.,
115 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub. nom. Sana Laboratories, Inc. v.
United States, 312 U. S. 688 (1941) ; United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (2d
Cir.1143
1930).
F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930).
12 See also Cheng Wai v. United States, 125 F. 2d 915 (2d Cir. 1942) ; In Re
Sana Laboratories, Inc., 115 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub nom. Sana
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 312 U. S. 688 (1941). But cf. United States
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Another test for determining whether an order denying or granting
a motion for suppression and return is appealable, was developed in
3
United States v. Cefaratti,1
in which after indictment, the defendant
made a pretrial motion to suppress evidence which was granted. Before
appeal, the government dismissed the indictment. The D. C. Circuit
held the order granting the motion appealable because it was a final order
within the meaning of section 1291, title 28, United States Code. The
court said that an order that does not terminate an action, but is, on the
contrary, made in the course of an action, has the finality that is required
for appeal under the code governing appellate jurisdiction of Courts of
Appeals, if (1) it has a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties, being a final disposition of a claimed right; (2) it is too important to be denied review; and (3) the claimed right is not an ingredi14
ent of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it.
A vigourous dissent urged that the court should not widen the ambit
for appeals by the government in criminal cases unless there is specific
statutory authority for so doing and that there was none here. Further,
the dissent reasoned that since the motion was made after indictment,
the order should be interlocutory and not independent.
This decision was followed in United States v. Stephenson,'" even
though the government did not dismiss the indictment before appealing.
But the D. C. Circuit again held the order appealable because of the
presence of the three requirements stated above in the Cefaratti case.
Again in 1956, this same court followed the rule in United States v.
Carroll,'6 and held that appeal would lie by the government from the
grant of a motion to suppress evidence seized from the persons of the
defendants when they were arrested even though indictments against the
defendants were still pending, when at least with respect to two counts
of the indictment, without the suppressed evidence, the prosecution could
not sficceed. The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the court
to hear the appeal, and the court held that an order which does not
terminate an action, has the finality required in section 1291, title 28
United States Code for appeal if (1), (2), and (3) above are present.
In United States v. Rosenwasser,'7 it was urged that when the government appeals from an order directing the suppression or return of
evidence, a dismissal of the appeal might forever deprive the government
v. Williams, 227 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir. 1955) ; Nelson v. United States, 208 F. 2d 505
(D. C. Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Mattingly, 285 Fed. 922 (D. C. Cir. 1922).
"202
"See
& Co. v.
"223
"234
1, 145

F. 2d 13 (D. C. Cir. 1952).
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1950) ; Swift
Compania Caribe, 339 U. S. 684 (1948).
F. 2d 336 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
F. 2d 679 (D. C. Cir. 1956).
F. 2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944).
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of questioning the suppression rule because of the government's limited
appellate rights in a criminal case. But the 9th Circuit pointed out that
this position of the government is no less favorable than in the usual case
of an adverse ruling on a point of evidence during a criminal trial, from
which ruling the government would have no immediate, and possibly no
future right of appeal.
On the other hand, the lack of power in the state to appeal was held,
8
to entitle the state to certiorari to test the validin State v. Fleckinger,1
ity of the lower court's action ordering the return of lottery paraphernalia alleged to have been illegally and unlawfully seized without a
warrant, and to prohibit the return of such paraphernalia, so that the
state might use it in evidence in the pending prosecution. This line of
reasoning seems to be similar to that in the Cefaratti, Stephenson, and
Carrollcases.
Where the motion to suppress and return is made by a stranger to
the criminal action or to the intended suit, the order granting or denying
his motion is final as to him, for unless he can sue out a writ of error,
he would be remediless. But where one is a party to a criminal action
pending, and petitions for the return of property that has been seized and
which is to be used in evidence upon the trial of the criminal action, the
ruling upon his petition has been held to be upon an intervening matter,
and is not a final decision. 19 The court in the Ponder case said that
where a stranger makes the motion, the order is final. But it is difficult
to see how the 4th Circuit could use this as an illustration of the individuality of the motion in that case. There it was said that because the
materials in question were public records, and because North Carolina
would have locus standi before the court to inquire of the future use or
disposition of them, and because some of the records had been returned
upon the application of public officials this case is akin to those applying
the rule that when a stranger to the litigation makes the motion, it is considered final and appealable. In this case, the applicant was not a
stranger, but was one of the defendants. Even if there were other applications for the suppression and return made by a stranger to the criminal
action, the ruling on the motion is final and appealable only as to him
because he is remediless unless he can sue out a writ of error, while the
parties to the litigation could wait until a final determination of the case
pending.
The court in the principal case also suggests the title and terms of
the impounding order as being among the "circumstances" indicating
18152 La. 337, 93 So. 115 (1922).
19 Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929) ; United States v. Rosenwasser,
145 F. 2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (D. C.
Cir. 1920) ; Coastline Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States, 259 Fed. 847 (2d
Cir. 1919).
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the independent character of the motion to suppress and return the impounded materials. But the court in Coastline Lumber & Supply Co. v.
United States,20 in which the defendant suggested that the title of his
petition indicated its independent character, rejected this contention and
said that the material consideration is whether the demand was made in
the criminal action or an independent proceeding. A defendant (and
the Government?) cannot make an interlocutory order final by the
choice of any particular form of words in its title.
The court in the Ponder case also distinguished United States v.
Williams,21 in which the same circuit in 1953 held the order for suppression and return of illicit whiskey not to be final, but a part of the pending
criminal prosecution. In that case, the motion to suppress and return
was made before the finding of the indictment, and was ruled on after
the indictment was brought. But the court said that the time of making
the motion and bringing the indictment is not the sole criterion for
deciding whether the motion is plenary or interlocutory. It was held
interlocutory because the test is whether the order is one of permanent
"general outlawry" against all use of documents involved, and since its
purpose was merely to prevent their use in a particular criminal proceeding then pending, it was interlocutory and not appealable.
Granting the distinction that in the Williams case the materials were
private property and in the principal case they are public records, does
not the fact that they were public materials make it more evident that the
motion here was part of the criminal case? The defendants did not want
the materials back, they no longer held the public office, and wasn't the
purpose of their motion merely to prevent the use of the materials in
the particular criminal proceeding then pending? Also, how could this
be a "general outlawry" against all use of the documents involved when
the court itself said that they were papers to which every citizen of the
State would be entitled to reasonable access?
The court in the Pondercase further stated that the order was appealable by virtue of section 3731, title 28, United States Code Annotated
which provides for appeal by the government in the Court of Appeals.
"... From a decision or judgment (of the district court) setting aside
or dismissing any indictment . . . except where a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. . . ." is permitted. Although the indictment here was
not dismissed, the court said that the order immobilized further prosecution on the indictment, and had the effect of dismissing the indictment
and that there is no reason to insist on the formality of dismissing it
before allowing appeal under the section.
The 4th Circuit's position on this point is disturbing. Aside from
2o259 Fed. 847 (2d Cir. 1919).

2'227 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir. 1955).
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the government's limited appellate rights in criminal cases, some circuits
and the United States Supreme Court have gone to great lengths in
curbing the tendency to widen the ambit for appeals by the government
in criminal cases. In United States v. Mattingly22 and Nelson v. United
States,23 the D. C. Circuit held an order entered on a motion to suppress
and return to be interlocutory even though the order was made before
indictment and ruled on after indictment was brought. This view was
impliedly affirmed by the United States Supreme Court when it was
noted, "after indictment and before trial, an order denying a defendant's
motion to suppress is not final and not appealable. We follow that view
because it serves the strong policy against piecemeal appeals. These
considerations of policy are especially compelling in the administration
of criminal justice. An accused is entitled to scrupulous observance
of constitutional safeguards. But encouragement of delay is fatal to the
vindication of the criminal law. Bearing the discomfiture and cost of
a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful
obligations of citizenship. The correctness of a trial court's rejection
even of a constitutional claim made by the accused in the process of
prosecution must await his conviction before its reconsideration by an
'24

appellate tribunal.
Also, in United States v. Janitz,2 5 a motion to suppress after the in-

dictment had been brought, was sustained, and the government went to
trial and acknowledged that it did not have enough evidence to establish
the charges of illicit manufacture of alcoholic beverages. The defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. But seeking a way- to
provide for an appellate review of the ruling upon the suppression of
evidence, the judge entered an order of dismissal of the indictment and
the government appealed. The question raised was whether the district
court's order was a judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a
demurrer or plea in abatement to any indictment. The 3rd Circuit held
it was none of these since the defendants made no attack on the indictment. The government's case failed because it had no evidence to
support it, and the court said that this was not the kind of judgment
to which the Criminal Appeals statute is directed.
The 4th Circuit in the principal case cited the Cefaratti, Stephenson,
and Carroll cases, discussed above, and United States v. BianCo,26 as
authority from other circuits in allowing the government to appeal an
22285 Fed. 922 (D. C. Cir. 1922).
23 208 F. 2d 505 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
"Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S.323, 327 (1940). See also Swift &
Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U. S.684 (1950) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U. S.541 (1948).
2 161 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1947).
20189 F. 2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951).
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order suppressing the evidence. In the latter case, the petition to
suppress and return seized lottery materials was filed-as a separate
proceeding-and the order denying the petition was entered, before
return of any indictment, clearly making it an independent proceeding,
and clearly distinguishing it from the principal case. The other three
cases, all from the D. C. Circuit, held that an order which does not
terminate an action but is, on the contrary, made in the course of an
action, has the finality that is required for appellate review under the
federal judiciary code section governing appellate jurisdiction of Courts
of Appeals, if (1) it has a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties, being a final disposition of a claimed right; (2) it is too important to be denied review; and (3) claimed right is not an ingredient
of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it.
The authority of these cases seems questionable inasmuch as these
cases rely on case law and not statute. 27 At common law, and today in
the absence of statutes, only a final judgment may be reviewed by way of
appeal and writ of error.28 Does the fact that without the evidence the
prosecution could not continue, make an otherwise interlocutory order a
final one? Is the fact that the question is too important to be denied
review sufficient to turn an interlocutory order into a final one? And
thirdly, who would deny that the claimed right here (that evidence is
inadmissible in the pending criminal prosecution) is not an ingredient of
the cause of action and does not require consideration with it?
As to the 4th Circuit's position on appealability by virtue of section
3731, title 28, United States Code Annotated, the court in the Janitz
case thought it necessary to appellate review that it go through the
"formality" of dismissing the indictment.
Although it seems unjust to require the government to wait until
a time when review of a suppressing order would be useless, such a
defect is largely the result of the policy which seeks efficient litigation.20
Resolution of the dilemma should come not from the judiciary but from
the legislature, which promotes that policy. In addition, the courts
have consistently guarded against an extension to the government of
the right to appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case unless
there is specific statutory sanction for it.8 0
RICHARD R. LEE.
= See note 13 supra.
28 See note 2 supra.
29 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940).
o United States v. Banges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892).

